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Introduction
An interesting dynamic has developed in the United States concerning the Inter-American Convention on Arbitration (the “Panama
Convention”). Courts in this country have overwhelmingly declined
to interpret and implement the Panama Convention to disputes concurrently governed by the New York Convention.2 The hesitation of
U.S. courts to apply, interpret, and build case law under the Panama
Convention begs the question of when and in what context the Panama
Convention remains relevant to international commercial arbitration in
the United States.
This Article briefly questions and explores the current relevancy
of the Panama Convention in commercial arbitration disputes between
Danielle Dean and Chelsea Masters are JD candidates at the American University
Washington College of Law.
2
Banco de Seguros del Estado v. Mut. Marine Offices, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 681,
684-86 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); see also Emp’r Ins. of Wausu v. Banco De Seguros Del Estado,
199 F.3d 937, 942 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that the Panama Convention incorporates
the New York Convention and that, even though the Panama Convention applies, the
court looks to case law construing the meaning of the New York Convention as a
means to interpret the Panama Convention).
1
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citizens of the United States and Latin American countries. Jan van
den Berg’s (“Van den Berg”) 1989 article not only discussed the possible interpretations of the Panama Convention but also predicted how
U.S. courts would ultimately apply such instrument over the years.3
Employing van den Berg’s framework as a model, this article analyzes
the development of case law involving the Panama Convention in U.S.
courts since 2005.4
First, this Article discusses the history of arbitration in Latin
America. Additionally, it highlights some reasons why the U.S. adopted
the Panama Convention as a regional arbitration instrument closely
resembling the New York Convention. Second, it examines how the
New York and Panama Conventions interact with one another under
U.S. law, observing that the former continues to infringe on matters
originally intended to be covered by the latter. Finally, and more concretely perhaps, this Article delves into three key stages of the arbitral
process—action to compel, determination of jurisdiction, and award
enforcement—and purports to explicate the role and function granted
to the Panama Convention therein. More broadly, the present work
desires to stress how accurate Professor van den Berg’s seminal work
on the Panama Convention was, whose analytical framework continues
to govern.
I. Background
A. Development of Arbitration in Latin America
The United States codified two conventions relevant to commercial
arbitration between the United States and most Latin American countries: the Panama Convention5 and the 1958 New York Convention on
Albert J. van den Berg, The New York Convention 1958 and Panama Convention
1975: Redundancy or Compatibility?, 5 Arb. Int’l 214 (1989). Professor van den
Berg is a world-renown arbitrator and arbitration expert who co-authored the highly
regarded “Preliminary Draft Convention on the International Enforcement of
Arbitration Agreements and Awards” (the Miami Draft).
4
For articles focusing on case law interpreting the Panama Convention before
2005, Helena Tavares Erickson et al., Looking Back, And Ahead: The Panama
Convention After 30 Years, 23 Alternatives To High Cost Litig. 184 (2005); Robin
Miller, Construction And Application Of Inter–American Convention On International
Commercial Arbitration, 1 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 309 (2005).
5
Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, 9 U.S.C. §§
301-07 (1990).
3
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the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the “New
York Convention”).6 Perhaps because the Panama Convention was
meant to mirror the terms, provisions, and system implemented by the
New York Convention,7 one must observe that even in those sections in
which the two instruments differ,8 Congress has indicated—and courts
have acknowledged—that both instruments were meant to be construed
and applied in the same manner.9
First ratified by the United States,10 the New York Convention was
intended to unify nations and forego regional standards for handling
arbitration disputes by adopting a standardized arbitration framework,
thereby doing away with national peculiarities concerning enforcement
requirements and procedures.11 However, before 1975, many Latin
American countries refused to sign on to the New York Convention,12
prompting the United States to adopt the Panama Convention to promote international commercial arbitration in Latin America.13 For
Latin America, ratifying the Panama Convention symbolized a marked
compromise14 in that it was a complete departure from its traditional
hostility toward U.S. foreign policy. Most importantly, this ratification
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 9
U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (1970).
7
See Productos Mercantiles E Industriales, S.A. v. Faberge USA, Inc., 23 F.3d
41, 45 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that the “legislative history of the Inter-American
Convention’s implementing statute clearly demonstrates that Congress intended the
Inter-American Convention to reach the same results as those reached under the New
York Convention”).
8
van den Berg supra note 3, at 221.
9
See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Banco Do Estado Do Rio Grande do Sul, S.A., 04 CIV. 1550
(DLC), 2004 WL 1398437, (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2004) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument
that the slight difference in wording requires a different interpretation of the Panama
Convention, instead holding the Panama Convention is meant to be interpreted in line
with the New York Convention).
10
9 U.S.C. §§ 301-07; 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08.
11
Nigel Blackaby et al., Overview of Regional Developments, in International
Arbitration in Latin America 3 (Nigel Blackaby et al. eds., 2002).
12
van den Berg, supra note 3, at 215.
13
Id. at 221.
14
The implementing legislation to the Panama Convention states that “[a]rbitral
decisions or awards made in the territory of a foreign State shall, on the basis of
reciprocity, be recognized and enforced under this chapter only if that State has ratified
or acceded to the Inter-American Convention” thereby not recognizing all foreign
arbitration awards who are not party to this regional arbitration convention. 9 U.S.C. §
304.
6
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removed “the philosophical objection to arbitration as a means of dispute resolution,”15 while sustaining at the same time consistency with
respect to the notorious—and investment-tailored—“Calvo” doctrine.16
For the United States, ratifying the Panama Convention meant bringing
Latin America into the fold of its own international commercial arbitration framework as well as creating a safer environment for many U.S.
corporations to invest in the Latin American market.17 In fact, since U.S.
adoption and codification of the Panama Convention, some observed
the rise in the use of arbitration clauses in commercial contracts and an
increase in the number of investment disputes involving Latin American
parties.18
B. Implementation and Interpretation of the Panama
Convention in the United States
Since its ratification, the interpretation of the Panama Convention by
U.S. courts has fallen in line with Professor van den Berg’s predictions,19
in that the absence of key provisions regarding the enforcement of
arbitration agreements or awards has prevented the jurisprudential
development of an autonomous case law.20 Indeed, in the long run, the
successful enforcement of many arbitral disputes would require a more
solid normative matrix to support its evolution. Thus, Congress and
U.S. federal courts developed two legal solutions to face the issue. First,
Congress codified the New York and Panama Conventions in a manner
that rendered them interrelated with the FAA, which contains explicit

van den Berg, supra note 3 at 221.
A foreign policy doctrine holding that jurisdiction in international investment
disputes lies with the country in which the investment is located. Alwyn V. Freeman,
Recent Aspects of the Calvo Doctrine and the Challenge of International Law, 40 Am.
Journal Int’l Law 1, 121-147 (1946).
17
132 Cong. Rec. S15,774 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1986) (stating that “the United States of
America will apply the Convention, on the basis of reciprocity, to the recognition and
enforcement of only those awards made in the territory of another Contracting State”
upon its ratification).
18
Blackaby et al., supra note 11.
19
Id.
20
van den Berg, supra note 3, at 221.
15
16
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provisions for compelling arbitration.21 Second, while incorporating
the Panama Convention into the United States Code, Congress virtually duplicated the already codified New York Convention’s language,
thereby guiding U.S. Courts to achieve the same results regardless of
whether the case was tried under the New York or Panama Convention.22
U.S. courts have generally utilized this second legal solution in one of
two ways. First, courts reasoned that, since the New York and Panama
Conventions were codified in such a way as to bring about the same normative outcome, the language of the New York Convention should govern instances where both instruments concurrently applied.23 Otherwise,
in rarer circumstances, U.S. Courts have directly cited Chapter Three of
Title Nine, under which the Panama Convention is codified.24 When presented with an arbitration agreement that falls under the auspices of the
Panama Convention, courts generally state that because the New York
and Panama Conventions were codified in the same manner and pursuant to and identical rationale, U.S. jurisprudence should favor the application of the New York Convention in lieu of the Panama Convention.25
The present paper will shed some light on the arbitral issues where
the Panama Convention retains exclusive governance and highlight
instances where U.S. courts have utilized the New York Convention
despite the applicability of the Panama Convention.

Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 4, 208, 307; Bautista v. Star Cruises, 396
F.3d 1289, 1296-97 (11th Cir. 2005); Martinez v. Columbian Emeralds, Inc., 2009
WL 57847 at *12-3 (V.I.) (dissent) for an exemplary analysis of how to untangle
the interrelated nature of Title 9. Note also that 9 U.S.C. §§ 208 and 307 stipulate
that Chapter One of the FAA applies residually to supplement provisions of both
Conventions where the FAA does not conflict. FAA, 9 U.S.C. §§ 4, 208, 307 (1947).
22
H.R. Rep. No. 501 at 4 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 675, 678. Productos
Mercantiles E. Industriales, S.A. v. Faberge USA, 23 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 1994) and
Republic of Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco Corp., 376 F. Supp. 2d 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
for cases basing interpretation of Panama on this intention.
23
Productos Mercantiles, 23 F.3d at 45. Note that there has been some debate as to
whether the Panama Convention should be interpreted when the same provisions under
the New York convention are also applicable. E.g. Nicor Int’l Corp v. El Paso Corp.,
292 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1371-72 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (describing in several paragraphs that
Panama applies to the Parties only to further the use of the New York Convention).
24
ChevronTexaco Corp., 376 F. Supp. 2d at 334.
25
Bautista, 396 F.3d at 1296-97.
21
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II. Panama Convention as Interpreted in U.S. Case Law
A. Action To Compel Arbitration
United States courts have shown a tendency to rely on the New York
Convention to compel parties to arbitrate a dispute.26 Only the New York
Convention stipulates that courts in contracting states must stay their
proceedings and are required to refer contracting parties in a qualified
dispute to arbitration.27 Because the Panama Convention does not arm
the parties with such actionable rights, U.S. courts commonly employ
the New York Convention as a means to compel parties to arbitrate
their disputes.28 Considering the inability of the Panama Convention to
independently compel arbitration, U.S. courts have generally tied the
language of the New York Convention, as well as its jurisprudence, to
arbitration clauses arising from the Panama Convention in lieu of its
missing provisions.29
Albeit merely in its dissent, Martinez v. Colombian Emeralds, Inc.
is one of the only cases to discuss whether the Panama Convention, as
codified under Chapter Three, is equipped to autonomously allow courts
to compel arbitration.30 In Martinez, the appellant was challenging a
trial court’s action compelling him to arbitrate his dispute. Rather than
considering the order to compel arbitration, the majority overturned the
lower court based on non-compliance with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.31 Despite believing that the Supreme Court of the Virgin
Islands lacked jurisdiction in this case, Justice Swan, an associate justice
of the Virgin Islands’ Supreme Court and former labor arbitrator, thoroughly evaluated the basis for deciding whether to compel arbitration
under the Panama Convention or New York Convention.32 This is where
Martinez proves unique. Although inevitably finding that the application
of the New York Convention was appropriate, Justice Swan noted that
van den Berg, supra note 3, at 221.
Id.; 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (“The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an
action in a matter in respect of which the parties have made an agreement within the
meaning of this article, shall, at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties
to arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or
incapable of being performed.”).
28
Nicor, 292 F. Supp. 2d at 1372 (2003).
29
Bautista, 396 F.3d at 1296-97.
30
Martinez v. Columbian Emeralds, Inc., 2009 WL 57847 at *6 (V.I. Mar. 4, 2009).
31
Martinez, 2009 WL 57847 at *6.
32
Id. at *12.
26
27
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under Chapter Three of Title Nine, courts could implement the Panama
Convention to compel arbitration.33 Section 303 of Title Nine is similar
to the New York Convention’s “Order to Compel Arbitration” codified
under section 206 of the same title.34 Interestingly enough, no other
court has chosen to directly link the language of Panama as codified in
9 U.S.C. § 303 to an action to compel arbitration.35 This may be due to
courts having more jurisprudence under the New York Convention.36
Another issue that has troubled both the New York and Panama
Conventions pertains to whether a court may ever allow a party to avoid
arbitration. The Second Circuit considered this very issue in Republic
of Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco Corp.37 In this case, the plaintiffs were
not seeking to compel arbitration, but rather asked the Court to prevent
arbitration, as well as grant them injunctive and declaratory relief.38
After reviewing numerous cases interpreting both the Panama and New
York Conventions, the Court decided that there was “little or no basis in
Second Circuit case law for invocation of the New York Convention or
the Inter-American Convention by a party seeking to avoid arbitration,
rather than compel or aid it.”39 Inevitably, the court had no choice but to
uphold the stay of the proceedings pending further investigation of the
laws of Ecuador.40
Despite these two more recent exceptions, Professor van den Berg’s
analysis of the Panama Convention remains essentially true: the Panama
Convention is hardly ever invoked to decide whether to compel arbitration despite being codified in the United States Code. Whatever the
Id. at *13.
9 U.S.C. §§ 206, 303 (“A court having jurisdiction under this chapter may direct
that arbitration be held in accordance with the agreement at any place therein provided
for, whether that place is within or without the United States.”).
35
Martinez, 2009 WL 57847 at *13.
36
See, e.g., Emp’r Ins. of Wausu v. Banco De Seguros Del Estado, 199 F.3d 937,
942 (7th Cir. 1999) (providing case law to support the court’s argument even though
the case law interprets the New York Convention instead of the analogous provisions
of Panama Convention).
37
376 F. Supp. 2d 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). In this case, the Second Circuit did not
dispute whether the New York Convention and/or the Panama Convention could be
cited to compel arbitration although they clearly preferred to interpret the case based
in the New York Convention as there is more jurisprudence regarding interpretation of
this Convention than there is in Panama.
38
Id. at 348-9.
39
Id. at 349.
40
Id. at 380.
33
34
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reasoning may be, United States Courts generally continue to evaluate
arbitration agreements under the New York Convention, even in cases in
which they could resort to the Panama Convention.
B. Acquiring Federal Jurisdiction: Invoking the Panama
Convention along with 28 U.S.C. § 1331
Many parties instrumentalize the Panama Convention as a tool to
remove a case to the federal court system. Indeed, the invocation of a
treaty renders their case removable as a federal question pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1331.41 Despite jurisdictional disagreements being uncommon in international commercial arbitration disputes, some courts
have approached the jurisdictional question.42 The latter has resulted in
analysis similar to those employed by federal courts when examining
questions involving treaties.43 However, federal courts have differed in
their use of the Panama Convention to establish jurisdiction.
Although jurisdiction based on federal question was unchallenged,
the Second Circuit made a point of evaluating the issue in Republic of
Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco Corp. The court found that a federal question existed in this case regardless of whether the New York or Panama
Conventions applied.44 It further elaborated on the issue of removal, stating that the Panama Convention, as implemented under 9 U.S.C. § 302,
allows the original-jurisdiction and removal provisions of Chapter Two
of the New York Convention to apply. Again, consistent with the trend
in U.S. courts, the court deferred to the New York Convention to interpret an agreement governed by the Panama Convention.45 However, this
is not because more jurisprudence existed to support a court evaluation
based on the New York Convention (as sometimes occurs with issues
like compelling arbitration).46 In establishing appropriate jurisdiction,
Removal of cases based on federal question is governed under 28 U.S.C § 1441
(2011).
42
ChevronTexaco Corp., 376 F. Supp. 2d at 347.
43
Id. at 334; Huntsman Corp. v. Int’l Risk Ins. Co., No. H-08-1542, 2008 WL
4453170, at *11 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2008); Higgins v. SPX Corp., No. 1:05-CV-846,
2006 WL 1008677, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 18, 2006).
44
ChevronTexaco Corp., 376 F. Supp. 2d at 345.
45
Bautista v. Star Cruises, 396 F.3d 1289, 1296-7 (11th Cir. 2005); Higgins, 2006
WL 1008677, at *2.
46
Bautista, 396 F.3d at 1296-97 (demonstrating how a court can compel arbitration
based on the wording of the Panama Convention but the jurisprudence of the New
York Convention).
41
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neither the strict language of the Panama Convention nor the New York
Convention as codified in the United States Code independently establish appropriate jurisdiction or removal procedures. 47 Therefore, the
language of New York proved indispensable in this situation.
C. Enforcement of Arbitral Awards
The majority of cases interpreting the Panama Convention do so in
the context of enforcing an arbitral award.48 Professor van den Berg’s
1989 article highlights the fact that “no major conflict between both
Conventions would seem to arise, except with the applicability of the
Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Commission (“IACAC”) rules”
which has held true within all U.S. case law discussing both treaties.49
Additionally, Professor van den Berg suggested that the U.S. legislation
implementing the Panama Convention would lead courts to interpret
and apply the Panama Convention over the New York Convention.50
While Professor van den Berg is technically correct, courts persist in
avoiding the Panama Convention, finding it unnecessary because the
9 U.S.C. §§ 301-07; 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16.
U.S. for use and Benefit of Immobiliaria y Constructora Mexcanusa v. Caddell
Construction, No. EP-09-CV-376-KC, 2010 WL 2622939, at *1 (W.D. Tex. June 25,
2010).
49
TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P., 487 F.3d 928, 929 (D.C. Cir. 2007);
van den Berg, supra note 3, at 224-28 (“It should be noted that the provisions in the
IACAC Rules are not limited to the arbitral proceedings but also include provisions on
the method of appointing arbitrators (Arts. 6–8). The effect of Article 3 of the Panama
Convention then is that, in case the parties have not agreed on a method of appointing
arbitrators, the method laid down in the IACAC Rules is to be followed. Such effect
constitutes the logical complement to Article 2 of the Panama Convention which
provides that the parties are free to agree on the method of appointing arbitrators. If
no such agreement is made, Article 3 comes to rescue by implying that the method of
appointment laid down in the IACAC Rules shall be applied.”).
50
van den Berg, supra note 3, at 221, 225 (“A rather unusual treaty provision, which
has no counterpart in the New York Convention, is to be found in Article 3, reading:
The IACAC Arbitration Rules, as amended in 1978, are virtually identical with the
Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) of 1976. Article 3 is very important for Latin America where local laws
on arbitration contain many types of provisions that may impede a smooth functioning
of the arbitration. Article 3 establishes that the agreement of the parties on arbitration
matters ranks first and that in the absence of such agreement the arbitration is to be
conducted in accordance with the modern IACAC Rules which are specifically geared
to international arbitration. In neither case, do the local rules of procedure apply since
provisions in treaties prevail over them.”).
47
48
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New York Convention already embodies not only all the relevant provisions, but also more tested provisions—and thus a more secured case
law.51 Such reluctance to resort to the Panama Convention often leads
courts to inaccurately apply the New York Convention to the enforcement of awards unless there is a conflict between the two conventions.52
When the United States ratified the Panama Convention, it made a
reservation53 stipulating that unless certain criteria were met, the Panama
Convention and the IACAC rules should not govern the enforcement
of an award.54 Accordingly, if these criteria were not satisfied nor met,
the New York Convention’s provisions would be incorporated into the
Panama Convention as codified in the U.S. Code.55 However, this reservation has no effect if the parties have expressly contracted otherwise.56
Courts generally conduct a three-step test when a party seeks to
enforce a foreign arbitral award in the United States under either the
New York or Panama Conventions.57 First, they must determine whether

TermoRio, 487 F.3d at 929.
Two cases interpret the Panama Convention on its own provisions and both cases
involved the parties’ use of the IACAC rules. This is consistent with this article’s
assessment that courts will continue to apply the New York Convention unless there
is a conflict between the Panama Convention and the New York Convention. See
Americatel El Salvador, S.A. de C.V. C.V. v. Compania de Telecomunicaciones de El
Salvador, S.A. de C.V., No. 07-21940-CIV, 2008 WL 1805476, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 20,
2008) (applying the Panama Convention to the parties’ agreement to use an amended
version of the IACAC rules to decide whether the U.S. should enforce an award prior
to the completion of foreign proceedings); see also DRC, Inc. v. Republic of Honduras,
774 F. Supp. 2d 66, 71 (D.D.C. 2011) (applying the Panama Convention to the parties’
agreement but reaching a contrary conclusion as to whether the U.S. should enforce
an award prior to the completion of foreign proceedings.); accord Hernandez v. Smart
& Final, Inc., No. 09-CV-2266 BEN NLS, 2010 WL 2505683, at *3 (S.D. Cal. June
17, 2010) (the court states inaccurately that it need only use the FAA, and if there are
any conflicts, only then look at the Panama Convention for guidance); Higgins v. SPX
Corp., No. 1:05-CV-846, 2006 WL 1008677, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 18, 2006).
53
9 U.S.C. § 305.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Empresa De Telecommunicaciones De Bogota S.A. E.S.P. v. Mercury Telco
Group, Inc., 670 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1361 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
51
52
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the Panama Convention should trump the New York Convention.58
Second, they look to whether the applicable provisions of the New
York Convention and the FAA are incorporated by reference into the
Panama Convention.59 Finally, if the New York Convention’s provisions
are incorporated into the Panama Convention, the court will apply and
interpret the New York convention instead of the Panama Convention.60
Even after establishing the Panama Convention’s primacy over the
New York Convention, U.S. courts continue to revert back to the New
York Convention should they find that opting for the Panama Convention
is unnecessary. It would be unnecessary if, for instance, the Panama
Convention’s provisions incorporated the New York Convention and the
FAA’s terms and the Panama Convention was meant to reach an identical outcome as the New York Convention.61 However, no court has yet
found that the Panama Convention’s provisions deviated substantially

9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (recognizing other multi-lateral and bilateral arbitration
treaties); 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (including both the New York Convention and the Panama
Convention); 9 U.S.C. §§ 301-07 (stating the Panama Convention applies only when
the parties the agreement are citizens of states that have ratified the Panama Convention
and the parties to the arbitration agreement are citizens of states that are members of
the OAS).
59
Empresa De Telecommunicaciones De Bogota, 670 F. Supp. 2d at 1362.
60
Courts may decline to use the Panama Convention in situations where the
Convention functions only to establish jurisdiction. See Figueiredo Ferraz Consultoria
E Engenharia De Projeto Ltda. v. Republic of Peru, 655 F. Supp. 2d 361, 374 (S.D.N.Y.
2009) (holding that while the Panama Convention “establishes jurisdiction in the
United States as a signatory state through a venue statute appended to the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA), there remains the authority to reject that jurisdiction for
reasons of convenience, judicial economy and justice”); see also Terminales Portuarios
Termiport, S.A. v. Saxon Energy Services Del Ecuador, S.A., No. H-06-3565, 2007
WL 4353711, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 11, 2007) (demonstrating that a court may also
refuse jurisdiction when the U.S. is not involved in the dispute, even though the parties’
States are signatories of the Convention and members of the OAS).
61
H.R. Rep. No. 501, at 4 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 675, 678. See
also Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 (1974) (stating “the goal of the
Convention and principle purpose underlying American adoption and implementation
of it, was to encourage the recognition and enforcement of commercial arbitration
agreements in international contracts and to unify the standards by which agreements
to arbitrate are observed and arbitral awards are enforced in the signatory countries”).
See e.g., Empresa De Telecommunicaciones De Bogota, 670 F. Supp. 2d at 1362.
58
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enough from the New York Convention and FAA’s terms to warrant an
autonomous interpretation and application of the Panama Convention.62
The obligation of U.S. courts to apply the Panama Convention for
certain disputes under 9 U.S.C. § 305 does not ultimately change the
court’s use of the New York Convention.63 In Termorio S.A. E.S.P. v.
Electranta S.P.,64 a contractor who had obtained an award in Colombia
against a utility company owned by the Colombian government sought
enforcement in the United States.65 The issue was whether the award
could be enforced in the United States after the Colombian court had
nullified it.66 The court held that it was unnecessary to discuss the
Panama Convention because its codification incorporated, by reference,
the relevant provisions of the New York Convention.67 This was so even
though the court recognized that the Panama Convention applied to the
dispute since Colombia is both a party to the Organization of American
States and a signatory to the Panama Convention.68 In other words, notwithstanding the Panama Convention’s indisputable applicability, the
court deemed the use of the Panama Convention irrelevant.69
Another strain to the Panama Convention framework concerns the
potential incorporation of the FAA’s terms. In Sanluis Developments,
L.L.C. v. CCP Sanluis, L.L.C.,70 the court addressed the claimant’s
motion to vacate an award by first finding that the Panama Convention
applied.71 It then stated that the Panama Convention incorporates the
Higgins v. SPX Corp., No. 1:05-CV-846, 2006 WL 1008677, at *1 (W.D. Mich.
Apr. 18, 2006); see Hernandez v. Smart & Final, Inc., No. 09-CV-2266 BEN NLS,
2010 WL 2505683, at *3 (S.D. Cal. June 17, 2010) (stating inaccurately that the court
need only use the FAA, and only in the event of conflict look at the Panama Convention
for guidance).
63
The court confuses the two Conventions to the point where no distinction is made
between the New York Convention and the Panama Convention. While the court
points out that the Panama Convention applies, it cites several provisions of the New
York Convention as if they were part of the Panama Convention. Int’l Transactions
Ltd. v. Embotelladora Agral Regiomontana S.A. de C.V., No. 3:01-CV-1140-G, 2007
WL 1944353, at *3 (N.D. Tex. June 29, 2007).
64
TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P., 487 F.3d 928, 929 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
498 F. Supp. 2d 699, 702 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
71
Id.
62
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terms of the FAA unless the FAA conflicts with the terms of the Panama
Convention under case law. 72 Therefore, the court revamped the same
analysis as the aforementioned cases to conclude that the Panama
Convention could be replaced not only by the New York Convention but
also by the FAA.
A common misapplication of the Panama Convention is a leading
trend in most cases involving enforcement of arbitral awards under this
Convention.73 The statute clearly states that the Panama Convention is to
be applied when certain conditions are met.74 Courts have misconstrued
this statute by developing case law that instead favors the New York
Convention and the FAA unless there are conflicts with the Panama
Convention.75
Conclusion
While U.S. federal courts and Congress have determined that the
Panama Convention takes precedence over the New York Convention,
these same courts frequently steer away from the Panama Convention,
preferring instead the New York Convention or the FAA to examine disputes technically falling within the purview of the Panama Convention.
In this regard, U.S. courts seem to discuss the Panama Convention only
so that they may apply New York Convention in resolving the international commercial arbitration dispute at hand. The trend indicates that
courts continue to treat the Panama Convention only as an extension
of the New York Convention—particularly when analyzing disputes to
compel arbitration, determine jurisdiction, and disputes over enforcement of an arbitral award. This current interpretative trend shows little
evidence of ever being overturned.
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